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INTRODUCTION
D AMAGES can add up to super-punitive amounts in unintended
ways. To take a textbook example: The Defendant has caused an
industrial accident or other mass tort. Plaintiff 1 sues, winning punitive
damages based on the reprehensibility of that original act. Plaintiff 2 al-
so sues-and also wins punitive damages on the same grounds. So do
Plaintiff 3, Plaintiff 4, and so forth.2 If each of these punitive awards is
directed at the same general badness of that original act, then these pun-
ishments are redundant. When such redundancy occurs, even damages
that are meant to be punitive can reach surprisingly punitive levels.4
2 To anticipate some of the analysis yet to come: Existing legal solutions for such a situa-
tion are widely seen as haphazard and inadequate. See infra Part I. Of special note is the
asymmetry in preclusion law, which cannot block such redundancy (because the plaintiffs
are not parties in each other's cases)-and may very well aggravate it (if the plaintiffs are
able to use nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel against the defendant). See, e.g., Taylor
v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884-85 (2008) (holding that nonparties cannot be bound by the
preclusive effect of past judgments or findings, except under limited conditions); Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (endorsing the use of nonmutual offensive
collateral estoppel). Meanwhile, aggregation devices (such as the mandatory punitive dam-
ages class action) that might serve as occasional discouragements to redundant awards have
fallen into disfavor. For a fuller analysis, see infra Part I.
3 The potential for redundancy can also be described, of course, in terms of overdeterrence
rather than duplicative retribution. (The commonly advanced-and often conflicting-
conceptual aims of punitive damages will be considered in more detail in Part I.) For in-
stance, overdeterrence will obviously occur if the punitive damages award in every individu-
al plaintiff's case is set at the fully deterrent amount, and multiple plaintiffs win this amount.
The need to avoid overdeterrence is clear when the aim of damages is assumed to be "opti-
mal deterrence" (that is, forcing actors to internalize the full social costs of their conduct).
But avoiding overdeterrence is also useful when the assumed aim is "absolute deterrence"
(that is, erasing all private gains to the actor from the conduct in order to reduce the activity
level to zero); the most familiar reason is a need to avoid distorting marginal deterrence. See
George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 526, 527 (1970) ("If
the offender will be executed for a minor assault and for a murder, there is no marginal de-
terrence to murder.").
4 Courts and commentators have given this problem various names, including "successive"
or "multiple" punitive damages-or simply the "multiple punishments problem." See, e.g.,
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003) (noting "the possibility of
multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct"); Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371,
1385 (3d Cir. 1993) (en banc) ("successive punitive damages awards"); Thomas B. Colby,
Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual,
Private Wrongs, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 583 (2003); Jim Gash, Solving the Multiple Punishments
Problem: A Call for a National Punitive Damages Registry, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1613 (2005);
Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 Yale L.J. 347, 428
(2003) ("multiple punishments").
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This Essay addresses two distinct ways in which unexpectedly exces-
sive damages may arise. The first and more straightforward problem is
redundant punitive damages, as in the scenario above. 5 The second
and more subtle problem is what we might call the "hyper-
enforcement" of statutory damages: when successful enforcement in
fact occurs more frequently than is implicitly assumed in the statutory
scheme (with awards preset at super-compensatory levels to make up
for some expected degree of under-enforcement). The result there is
that damages not meant to be punitive can nonetheless stack up to pun-
ishing effect, most famously when thousands or millions of claims are
aggregated. Both problems are classic concerns that have defied tidy
resolution despite decades of anxious recognition by courts and
commentators.6
These two classes of problems are united by a central feature that has
yet to receive conceptual articulation: In each context, the damages a de-
fendant should pay for a single bad act contain both a "variable" compo-
nent (which properly varies with the number of victims or nominal
counts), as well as a "fixed" component (which should be awarded only
once for the given act).7 The crucial mistake that can lead to surprisingly
punitive damages in each context is repeatedly awarding the "fixed" por-
tion along with the "variable" portion when multiple awards are based
on the same underlying act.
A procedural solution for neutralizing such redundancy is readily
suggested by this conceptual framing: Allow courts to run concurrently
the "fixed" component of these repeated awards. This Essay explains
5 More complicated variations of this simplified initial scenario are addressed in Part I.
Note that rather than calling the problem "multiple" or "successive" punishment, I favor the
term "redundant" in part to recognize that not all repetitions of punitive damages are exces-
sive. Multiple awards of punitive damages may well be necessary (and thus not redundant)
to reach the proper level of deterrence or retribution for a given act by a defendant; this
might be especially true given the current state of constitutional constraints on the sizes of
awards. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (warning that "few awards exceeding a single-digit
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due
process"). Such crude constraints, of course, do not generally prevent the repetition of puni-
tive damages from reaching the point of redundancy.
6 The first problem is indeed a textbook example of redundancy-and of courts expressing
helplessness given the current state of the law. See Mark A. Franklin, Robert L. Rabin &
Michael D. Green, Tort Law and Alternatives 774 (9th ed. 2011). Part I elaborates on this
problem.. For examples of commentary on the second problem, see Section H.A.
7 Alternatively, for a single course of conduct that involves many acts, the "variable" com-
ponent is the amount that should vary with the number of acts, and the "fixed" component is
the amount that should be awarded only once for that single course of conduct.
2014] 1029
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how it can be applied to each of the two classes of problems. In earlier
work, I have illustrated how the use of concurrent damages can repair
the gross inaccuracies that occur when statutory damages awards are
blindly pegged to a nominal count of violations rather than to the con-
duct's real effects.8 Here, the focus shifts to a more complicated form of
redundancy in damages, and thus to a more nuanced use of concurrent
damages: The court should identify the portion of each damages award
that would be redundant if repeated in other awards (in the same case or
in other cases) and then designate that portion to run concurrently with
the other awards.
Part I will explore how courts can apply this solution to the first prob-
lem, that of punitive damages being redundantly awarded to multiple
plaintiffs for the same original act. In one basic approach, a court might
view compensatory damages as the "variable" component and punitive
damages as the "fixed" component of its award. On this view, the court
would run (only) its punitive damages concurrently with those awarded
by other courts.
Refinements to this baseline method may be needed, however, de-
pending on what the court assumes the purpose of punitive damages to
be, on how many individual punitive damages awards are needed to
serve that purpose, on whether the court takes a defendant- or plaintiff-
focused view of punitive damages, and on whether the court is allowed
to use concurrence in anticipation of future awards (as is possible in
concurrent criminal sentencing9). These variations are analyzed in Part I,
along with the general procedural advantages of the concurrent damages
solution.
Part II will turn to the statutory damages problem. Statutory damages
are often said to be set at super-compensatory levels, based on the prem-
ise that enforcement will be imperfect, that proof will be difficult, or that
private suits will need extra inducement. But such an understanding also
implies that whenever successful enforcement is more likely than as-
sumed in the original statutory design, the resulting expected damages
will be overly deterrent.
Two variants of this hyper-enforcement problem will be addressed,
along with heuristics for using concurrent damages as a corrective for
8 Bert I. Huang, Concurrent Damages, 100 Va. L. Rev. 711 (2014).
9 See Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1473 (2012) (endorsing the power of federal
courts to run criminal sentences either consecutively or concurrently with anticipated but
yet-to-be-adjudicated state criminal sentences for the same conduct).
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Surprisingly Punitive Damages
each. The first variant occurs when higher counts of violations attract
more enforcement attention or more avid plaintiffs, or lead to easier de-
tection or proof.
A second variant arises due to minimum statutory per-count awards
that are set at high levels to encourage individual plaintiffs to sue on
claims that would otherwise be too small to be worth litigating. The
problem is that beyond a certain threshold, there is no longer any need
for such subsidies to continue accumulating with every count."° And
where thousands or even millions of counts can be claimed or aggregat-
ed in a given case, the redundant accumulation of these inducements to
sue can reach astonishing sums."1
Finally, the Conclusion will propose a thought experiment that high-
lights both limitations and possible extensions of the present analysis:
What if these sorts of excessive damages are not "surprises" at all, but
instead are messages aimed at deterring overconfident actors who think
they are more likely to evade enforcement than they really are? Is
"acoustic separation" then useful, or even necessary, for the practical
application of concurrent damages?
I. REDUNDANT PUNITIVE DAMAGES
"Overkill" is what Judge Henry Friendly famously called it-and
yet he could not point to a general solution to the potentially "stag-
gering" problem of redundant punitive damages. 3 The courts have
not had better luck in the forty years since.' 4 And neither has Con-
10 The desired litigation subsidy may thus be understood as the "fixed" component of the
damages scheme, in such a case.
" Most famous may be the flurry of class actions under the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952, based on errors in printing
customer receipts-such as the suit against Chuck E. Cheese restaurants with claims poten-
tially amounting to $1.9 billion. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
12 The analysis thus emphasizes the essential point that perceptions-including mispercep-
tions-are what matter for ex ante incentives.
13 Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967) ("We have the
gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of
actions throughout the nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill.... We know of no
principle whereby the first punitive award exhausts all claims for punitive damages and
would thus preclude future judgments .... ).
14 This is not for any lack of concern or notice of the problem. See, e.g., Dunn v. HOVIC,
1 F.3d 1371, 1385 (3d Cir. 1993) (en banc) ("[T]he point of 'overkill' has been reached with
respect to punitive damages in asbestos litigation."). Indeed, judges have long warned of po-
tential constitutional implications. See, e.g., Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 398 (2d
2014] 1031
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gress. I5 The concern seems to have motivated the U.S. Supreme Court
in developing its due process limitations, 16 and yet the Court has also
studiously avoided confronting the problem head-on.17 A few states have
devised a mixed bag of constraints, such as offsets or flat bans on later
awards, but there has been little coherence among their approaches.18
A. Concurrent Damages as a Solution
The concurrent damages approach offers the hope of an analytically
coherent solution. At least, it offers a clear conceptual frame for under-
standing what any fix for the problem should aspire to do. As an initial
exploration, the following analysis will sketch the starting principles for
running punitive damages concurrently, note some potential advantages
and obstacles, and touch on how concurrence relates to other procedural
devices (such as preclusion and aggregation). The analysis will focus on
how to extract the right amount of punitive damages from the defendant
and not on how that windfall should be given out to plaintiffs,' 9 though it
Cir. 1989) (noting that "the multiple imposition of punitive damages for the same course of
conduct may raise serious constitutional concerns"); In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d
1175, 1188 (8th Cir. 1982) ("Unlimited multiple punishment for the same act determined in
a succession of individual lawsuits and bearing no relation to the defendants' culpability or
the actual injuries suffered by victims, would violate the sense of 'fundamental fairness' that
is essential to constitutional due process."). But the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to address
the issue directly. See infra note 17.
15 Two attempts in the Senate failed in committee. See Multiple Punitive Damages Fair-
ness Act of 1995, S. 671, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch); Multiple
Punitive Damages Fairness Act of 1997, S. 78, 105th Cong. (1997) (re-introduced by Sena-
tor Hatch).
16 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003) (noting the
problem of multiple punitive damages awards).
17 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 612 n.4 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that the Court declines "to address the question of multiple punitive damages
awards stemming from the same alleged misconduct"). The Court's latest guidance in Philip
Morris USA v. Williams seems to inch closer to the problem: Juries are not to punish the de-
fendant for harms done to non-parties-and yet they may still consider such non-party harms
in judging the act's reprehensibility when assessing punitive damages. 549 U.S. 346, 353-55
(2007). But this guidance cannot bar the redundancy that occurs when each jury awards its
own plaintiff for the inherent reprehensibility of the act (as supposed in the initial illustration
above). Moreover, the case provides cover for jury awards that do count harms to others un-
der the rubric of reprehensibility.
18 On the relative virtues and shortcomings of such approaches, see infra note 46 and ac-
companying text.
19 How punitive damages are allocated among plaintiffs is a secondary concern, conceptu-
ally, under the modern view that punitive damages are defendant-focused rather than plain-
tiff-focused. Punitive damages are now generally understood to be a windfall for (rather than
1032
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will make note of various judicial approaches already in use for allocat-
ing a single award among multiple claimants. Other important consid-
erations-such as how the concept of concurrence may be put to work in
the context of repeated settlements 20-are reserved for future analysis.
21
an entitlement of) plaintiffs-a view reflected in split-recovery statutes that divert a large
share of punitive damages away from the winning plaintiff and into the state treasury or to
charitable uses. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492 (2008) ("Regardless of
the alternative rationales over the years, the consensus today is that punitives are aimed not
at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct."); Sharkey, su-
pra note 4, at 370-80. This distinction may be blurred in those cases where punitive damages
as a practical matter serve to make up for gaps in compensation or serve as an inducement to
bring suit. Although such circumstances are omitted from the present analysis, needless to
say, they would not generally justify awarding exactly the full measure of punitive damages
to every plaintiff. Moreover, creating a concurrence option at least allows the judge to make
the call in any case involving such a tradeoff-between reducing lawsuits or undercompen-
sating, on the one hand, and overdeterring or overpunishing, on the other-as opposed to
automatically defaulting in favor of the latter. It should also be noted that, whenever it may
be useful for more than one plaintiff to receive some amount of punitive damages, the con-
current damages option (which allows the possibility that punitive damages will be shared
among plaintiffs) is superior to the first-come, first-served approach used in some states,
which permits an award of punitive damages to only the first plaintiff. See infra notes 41-46
and accompanying text.
20 For a recent illustration of taking a prior settlement into account in assessing later fines
and penalties-in effect running them concurrently- see the Justice Department's plea
agreement with SAC Management. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Manhattan U.S. At-
torney Announces Guilty Plea Agreement with SAC Capital Management Companies (Nov.
4, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/Novemberl 3/
SACPleaPR.php ("Because the SAC Companies have already agreed to pay $616 million to
the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission to resolve related civil insider trading charges,
that amount will be credited against today's penalty [of $1.8 billion], and therefore, the addi-
tional payment required under this Agreement will be approximately $1.2 billion.").
21 It may be worth noting here, however incompletely, three starting points for the analysis
of settlements. First, the use of concurrence (or not) by the courts in determining punitive
damages awards will presumably cast the shadow in which settlements are negotiated. Sec-
ond, as a general matter, settlements already must specify the scope of the defendants' con-
duct for which liability is being released. Thus the question is not whether that information
must be generated, but whether it is kept confidential between the settling parties-and if
anything, one might expect the attractive prospect of later courts running their awards con-
currently with past settlements to induce defendants to publicize the scope of conduct cov-
ered by those settlements. Third, the implementation mechanics of distributing funds from a
settlement to future judgments (or future settlements) would not present entirely new prob-
lems, as solutions have already been developed in some contexts. See, e.g., In re Carolina
Tobacco Co., 360 BR. 702, 706-07 (D. Or. 2007) (describing the escrow account required
by a settlement with states for the payment of future judgment awards).
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1. "Fixed" and "Variable" Damages
One simple principle should guide the use of concurrent punitive
damages: If a judge believes that some portion of the total damages in a
case before him reflects an amount that this defendant should not be
made to pay repeatedly, then he should designate this portion to run
concurrently with the awards in other cases. To use the vocabulary in-
troduced earlier, the judge should distinguish between the "fixed" and
"variable" components of the total award in that case-in effect allow-
ing only the variable component to be repeated in other cases, by run-
ning the fixed component concurrently.
Consider this most basic of possible scenarios (call it Scenario 1):
Suppose that the judge views the punitive damages in the case as repre-
senting full legal retribution for the defendant's entire course of conduct.
He would then run the whole of the punitive award concurrently with
those in other cases.
The following refinements to this prototype approach illustrate how
the use of concurrent damages can be adapted to varying circumstances:
first, under competing theories about the purpose of punitive damages;
second, along the spectrum of views of punitive damages, from defend-
ant-focused to plaintiff-focused; and third, when courts are able or un-
able to run damages concurrently with future awards.
2. Differing Aims of Punitive Damages
The consensus modem view is that punitive damages serve a dual
function-retribution and deterrence.22 Yet these aims do not always
align. The amount needed for retribution may not be equal to what is
needed to deter. Nor is there always agreement on what each term
means, and one might sensibly think that the best meaning should vary
by context. Consider the question of what amount is needed to "deter":
Does that refer to what is conventionally called optimal deterrence (that
is, loss internalization)? Or rather, to absolute deterrence (that is, erasing
22 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 492 ("Regardless of the alternative rationales
over the years, the consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but prin-
cipally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct."); BMWofN. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. at 568
("Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in pun-
ishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.").
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any gains from the misconduct)?23 Or to still some other understanding
of deterrence?
Fortunately, the general usefulness of concurrence in reducing redun-
dancy does not much depend on any particular answer to these ques-
tions. Yet in operation variations do arise depending on which purpose is
assumed, because it affects the question of what portion of damages is
understood to be the "fixed" component that should run concurrently
across cases. As a practical matter, the importance of these variations
may well be washed out by the rough-justice nature of assigning mone-
tary damages, and especially punitive damages, in the first place. But it
is still useful for the sake of conceptual clarity to point them out.
Deterrence versus retribution. - First, consider the distinction be-
tween the dual aims. How might a court focused on deterrence (whether
optimal or absolute) differ from a retribution-oriented court in deciding
which portion of the damages award to designate as running concurrent-
ly? One critical difference is the role of compensatory damages. A judge
taking a retributive approach may view them as irrelevant to punishment
(as we have assumed in Scenario 1 above). By contrast, the degree of
deterrence depends on the total damages amount, including compensato-
ry damages.24
Thus a judge who believes she has achieved the full measure of deter-
rence, via the total damages in the case before her, would not want any
of that amount to be revisited on this same defendant (for the same con-
duct) by other courts. The sum of the compensatory and punitive dam-
ages in this case alone is all the deterrence that the judge thinks is need-
ed. The court may well have reached this result by using punitive
damages to make up the difference between the compensatory damages
and the desired deterrent amount. In essence, the "fixed" component of
damages here is the entire award.
What this deterrence-oriented judge should run concurrently, in theo-
ry, are the total damages (not only the punitive damages). But in prac-
tice, she cannot do so. She must actually award the compensatory dam-
23 It should be emphasized that for both the optimal deterrence and absolute deterrence ap-
proaches, accuracy in damages is useful-not least because of the familiar need to set mar-
ginal deterrence correctly. See Stigler, supra note 3.
24 This is true under both the loss-internalization (optimal deterrence) and the gains-
erasing (absolute deterrence) views. Compensatory damages are more closely related to the
former, for obvious reasons. But under either view they should be recognized as part of the
total costs to the defendant, and thus part of the deterrent.
2014] 1035
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ages in the present case. So the best she can do is to say that the punitive
damages are to run concurrently. At this point, she may seem to be act-
ing identically to the retribution-oriented judge in Scenario 1. But here is
the crucial difference: The deterrence-oriented judge should run the pu-
nitive damages in this case concurrently with not only the punitive dam-
ages in other cases, but with any damages in other cases, including those
that are compensatory.
Note that although this approach minimizes overdeterrence, there may
still be some slippage-if courts can only run their damages concurrent-
ly with past awards. Suppose that the first court awards damages in the
fully deterrent amount. Then the best that the second court can do is to
run its own punitive damages award concurrently with the total damages
in the first case. Because the defendant will also pay the compensatory
damages in this second case, the defendant ends up overpaying relative
to the accurately deterrent amount (though this redundancy is far less
than without concurrence). 25 This structural feature, that a court cannot
designate its own compensatory damages to run concurrently, is a com-
plication for the deterrence approach-but not for the retribution ap-
proach assumed in Scenario 1.
Shared and individual components of retribution. - Next, let us con-
sider how courts focused on only one of the dual aims, retribution, might
nonetheless vary in their ideal use of concurrence. Imagine a variation
on Scenario 1: What if a judge does not view the punitive damages in
her case as reflecting the full legal retribution this defendant should have
to face, and so she believes that further punitive damages in other cases
may be warranted (to some extent)? For instance, she might see her role
as assigning punitive damages to serve retribution on behalf of this spe-
cific plaintiff, but not on behalf of other victims.2 6
She might then conceive of this plaintiffs total punitive damages as
having two parts: One portion serves the aim of retribution for the de-
fendant's reprehensibility as directed only at this specific plaintiff. She
may well expect other judges to award such a portion to their plaintiffs
as well. She would view these per-plaintiff portions not as redundant,
but as a "variable" component of punitive damages and thus properly
cumulative across cases.
25 As we shall see, reducing or avoiding such slippage may be possible if the courts can
also run damages concurrently with future awards. See infra Subsection I.A.3.
26 The judge would thus be acting in the spirit of Philip Morris, discussed supra note 17.
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Meanwhile, she may see a separate portion of this plaintiffs punitive
damages as serving the aim of retribution for the inherent, general bad-
ness of the defendant's conduct (from which this plaintiff also suf-
fered)-the "fixed" quantum of reprehensibility shared among the vic-
tims, punishable by a one-time levy against the defendant. This portion
of the punishment would be redundant if other courts also awarded it.
(And yet at least one court must mete out this part of the punishment.)
Because retribution on behalf of any plaintiff would be incomplete with-
out this component, each court's award should include it.27 But then
each court should also run this portion of the punitive award (and only
this portion) concurrently with the awards in other cases.
The usual principle thus still applies, but now the "fixed" portion is
only a subset of the punitive damages in each individual case. The nar-
rower point here is that the portion of the damages a court runs concur-
rently need not always be the full punitive damages award. 28 The more
general point is that concurrence is an option, not a command. Its use
can be flexibly adapted to understandings of punitive damages that vary
from judge to judge, or from situation to situation.29
3. Anticipation of Future Awards
Should the concurrence device be only backward-looking, with later
courts running their new awards concurrently with past awards? Or
should it be used even by earlier courts, in a forward-looking way, as is
Fo sibk. with concurren c riing? 3° There is no conceptua!
reason that concurrence cannot be used in anticipation of future
awards-and there are good practical reasons to encourage such use.
Concurrence is a more powerful, and more user-friendly, tool when it
can be used by earlier courts as well as by later courts.
Think again of the deterrence-focused judges described above, who
are hamstrung by not being able to run compensatory damages concur-
27 Note again that including such a shared component of reprehensibility would not likely
run afoul of Philip Morris (as discussed supra note 17) because it is properly part of the pun-
ishment for this plaintiff's harm-just as it would be for any other plaintiff.
28 The chosen subset may be of any size, of course: At one extreme, the "subset" may be
as large as all of the punitive damages (as it was in Scenario 1 above). At the other extreme,
it may be a null set, in which case the judge forgoes concurrence altogether.
29 The complications that can arise when successive judges (dealing with the same con-
duct) disagree about the use of concurrence will be explored in the next Section.30 See, e.g., Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463 (2012).
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rently. If concurrence is only backward-looking, then even if all punitive
damages run concurrently, the compensatory damages will continue to
accumulate case by case-each time causing the defendant to overpay
further beyond the fully deterrent amount.
But notice how the problem dissipates if concurrence can be used in a
forward-looking, anticipatory way. In the first case, the judge announces
that the punitive damages award is to run concurrently with any past or
future damages (both compensatory and punitive) for the same course of
conduct.31 The task for the second judge is identical, and so forth for
each later court. As successive cases occur, their formal punitive awards
not only run concurrently with each other-but also partially or fully ab-
sorb the accumulation of compensatory damages.
To illustrate, consider a defendant who causes identical harms to
Plaintiffs 1 through 5. Suppose that for this act, the courts adopt an op-
timal deterrence purpose for punitive damages. The courts are (collec-
tively) aiming for full loss internalization; that is, aggregate damages
should total five times the individual harm. Court 1 achieves this optimal
deterrence amount by awarding compensatory damages (one times the
harm) and makes up the rest using punitive damages (four times the
harm). Suppose Court 2 does the same.
Imagine if Court 1 can run its punitive damages concurrently withfu-
ture damages, including Court 2's compensatory damages. Now both
Court 1 and Court 2 can simply say, "My punitive damages run concur-
rently with any past or future damages in any other cases." First the de-
fendant will pay one measure of harm to each of Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff
2 (as compensatory damages). Suppose the defendant then pays three
further measures of harm to Plaintiff 1, as punitive damages. Now, Court
2's punitive damages award is also satisfied via concurrence, because
those four measures of harm have been paid to Plaintiff 1. At the same
time, Court l's punitive damages award is also fully satisfied, because
three measures of it have been directly paid to Plaintiff 1, and one meas-
ure is running concurrently with Plaintiff 2's compensatory damages.32
31 By doing so, the first judge has in effect solved the next judge's problem of not being
able to declare that compensatory damages are to run concurrently (because the first judge
has already made that happen).
32 In contrast, if concurrence is only possible in a backward-looking way, then Court 2
would run its punitive damages concurrently with Court 1 's damages award; but the com-
pensatory damages in Court 2 would push the defendant's payments from the optimal deter-
rence amount of five times harm up to six times harm (and so forth for each further case).
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(The logic works just as well if any or all of the three extra measures of
harm are paid to Plaintiff 2 instead.)
The defendant has thus discharged his liability upon paying five times
the harm, as desired. At the same time, the defendant cannot satisfy both
courts' awards by paying any less. Moreover, further judgments (by
Courts 3, 4, and 5) are similarly absorbed; in particular, the compensato-
ry damages that must be paid to those plaintiffs are credited to the puni-
tive damages of the other courts, and again the defendant will not ever
pay more (nor can it get away with paying less) than the optimal amount
of five times the harm.
The illustration above shows how the use of anticipatory concurrence
can mitigate the slippage problem noted above. More importantly, it
highlights an approach in which each court need only follow a simple
heuristic, one that relieves them of needing to know how many other
courts are giving awards, and how much those awards might be. Unlike
other possible anticipatory adjustments (such as reducing damages in an
earlier case based on a prediction that later cases will arise), no such
guesswork is needed here: A court need only declare that its awards are
to run concurrently with any past or future awards.
Allocating among plaintiffs. - There is a tradeoff to such simplicity
at the adjudication stage, however, in that the courts will then need to
make practical determinations about how to allocate the concurrent
amount among the plaintiffs who do materialize. Allocation of this sort
is a familiar (if not always an easy) task for the courts. For instance,
think of bankruptcy proceedings, "contribution" among joint tortfeasors,
or any case involving multiple plaintiffs sharing a "limited fund." One
might even think of such allocation among plaintiffs as a sort of joint-
and-several recovery.
These analogies suggest two points: First, in the present context there
is arguably less at stake in precisely how the concurrent amount is allo-
cated than in the other settings. The reason is that punitive damages are
generally understood to be the penalty the defendant deserves to pay, not
compensation that plaintiffs deserve to receive;33 this is perhaps best il-
lustrated by "split-recovery" statutes that reallocate a large share of pu-
nitive damages away from winning plaintiffs to the state treasury or to
33 See supra note 19.
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charitable funds.34 Second, as a technical matter, the various devices that
the courts have used to serve these other allocation needs-such as es-
crows or trusts, equitable allocation principles, or time limits for further
plaintiffs to come forward-may be adaptable to the distribution of the
concurrent award.35 For example: Court 1 can require the defendant to
pay Plaintiff 1 her compensatory award immediately, but set aside funds
in escrow or trust for the punitive award, on the understanding that
Plaintiff 1 will be paid an equitable share of those reserved funds after a
fixed time period (a share that depends on how many other plaintiffs
have won punitive damages in that time).36 Court 2 can then require that
some or all of the payment to Plaintiff 2 come from that initial escrow or
trust (which Court 1 will allow because that is the very point of setting
up such a fund), or Court 1 can release an appropriate amount of the re-
served funds back to the defendant, based on the amount the defendant
verifies it has directly paid to Plaintiff 2.
34 See, e.g., 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-1207 (2012); Iowa Code § 668A.1(2)(b) (2013); Or.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31.735 (West 2013). For further analysis of such "split-recovery" statutes,
see Sharkey, supra note 4, at 375-80.
35 See, e.g., Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1394 (3d Cir. 1993) (en banc) (Weis, J., dis-
senting) ("The district court [in another case] intervened to impose measures for a more eq-
uitable distribution of the funds and eventually approved an arrangement that altered the dis-
tribution process so that those most seriously injured were paid first. In addition, a serious
attempt was made to predict future claims so that present and future claimants would be paid
an equitable percentage of their claims' value." (citations omitted)). Courts have used escrow
accounts for the payment of future judgment awards. See, e.g., In re Carolina Tobacco Co.,
360 B.R. 702, 706-07 (D. Or. 2007) (describing escrow account required by a settlement
with states for the payment of future judgment awards). Courts have also used trusts to col-
lect and distribute punitive damages awards. See, e.g., Sampson v. Vasey, No. LA28882,
2007 WL 4555839, at *1 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Sept. 4, 2007) ("[T]he punitive damages shall be
deposited into the plaintiff's attorney's trust account for distribution after reduction of attor-
ney fees and a proportionate share of the out of pocket costs of recovery with 25% of the
gross recovery of punitive damages to the Plaintiff and the remainder paid into the civil repa-
rations trust fund." (citing Fernandez v. Curley, 463 N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1990), regarding Io-
wa's split-recovery statute)); Payne v. Cmty. Blood Ctr., No. 0210-10211, 2004 WL
5400536, at *3 (Or. Cir. Ct. Oct. 25, 2004) ("[T]he Court notes that allegations of punitive
damages remain pending against Defendant Cryolife, Inc., and that both compensatory and
punitive damages may, at some future time, be deposited into the Trust.").36 It will likely be in the defendant's interest to inform Court 1 of any other future potential
punitive damages awards (and future claimants) it may face for the same conduct once Court
1 has decided on the amount of punitive damages and is considering whether to run them
concurrently.
37 To be clear, each plaintiff will receive its full compensatory damages. But beyond that,
how much of the remaining windfall goes to Plaintiff 1 and how much goes to Plaintiff 2 can
be guided by any equities in play. As a practical matter, such equities may be weighed by the
fund administrator, as is commonly done in distributing a "limited fund" or class-wide dam-
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When courts disagree. - A conceptually more important complica-
tion is that successive courts may disagree about whether the punitive
awards (or how much of the awards) should run concurrently in the first
place. The mechanism illustrated above may seem to favor the courts
that do think the award should run concurrently, in that a court always
has the power to unilaterally reduce how much the defendant pays to
that particular plaintiff (with the compensatory amount as the presump-
tive floor) but cannot require another court to award more. For example,
Court 2 may decide to run its punitive damages award concurrently with
that assessed by Court 1. But, assuming it does not manipulatively over-
inflate its own award, Court 2 cannot undo Court l's decision to run pu-
nitive damages concurrently with later awards. The influence of Court 1
is also limited, however: Undermining Court l's intentions (in favor of
those courts that think the punitive awards should accumulate) is still
possible if more courts decline to run their awards concurrently. The
reason is that Court l's use of concurrence can only effectively discount
future awards by the amount of punitive damages that Court 1 itself has
assessed. Extending this logic further, then, one might see the end result
of the successive courts' independent decisions about concurrence to be,
loosely speaking, a sort of weighted average of their choices.38
B. Procedural Advantages
This Section will highlight a few procedural advantages of using the
concurrent punitive damages device. The wellspring of these advantages
is the conceptual integrity of this approach: Concurrence is not an ad hoc
adjustment or judicial "fudging" (in contrast to preemptive reductions of
earlier awards or complete bars on later awards). Quite the opposite. The
concurrence mechanism neatly suits the reality of the overlapping en-
forcement problem: When there are concurrent enforcers, isn't the most
natural solution just to give concurrent awards?
ages. The possibility of allocating among plaintiffs based on the equities-rather than based
on factors such as who won the race to the courthouse-may be seen as a further advantage
of the concurrence option over the alternative devices noted in Subsection I.B.2.
38 To extend the earlier illustration: If Courts 1, 2, 3, and 4 all run their awards concurrent-
ly as before but Court 5 refuses to do so, then the defendant will end up paying nine (as op-
posed to five) measures of individual harm; this is still less than the multiplier of twenty-five
that would occur in the absence of a concurrence option.
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1. Information Costs
Think back to this salutary aspect of using anticipatory concurrence:
Hardly any anticipation is needed at all. The court need not be aware of
other cases addressing the same conduct-much less of whether those
cases have resulted (or will result) in awards of any given size. Court 1
does not even need to know that it is Court 1, and Court 2 does not need
to know that it is Court 2.
This feature speaks to a more general advantage of the concurrence
approach: Each court can determine its own award as if it had the only
case against this defendant. Each can simply declare the full amount of
punishment deserved on behalf of its plaintiff. Notably, such undimin-
ished declarations may also serve the public notice and socially expres-
sive aims of allowing each court, in each jurisdiction and in each plain-
tiffs case, to mark its own condemnation of the act.
The practical upshot is that the information demands on the courts are
lightened in setting their awards: No court needs to figure out how much
to remit its award because another court has given (or might yet give)
punishment for the same act.4° It also does not matter how many other
such cases there will be. A corollary is that Court 1 then has no need to
predict whether its outcome will encourage future lawsuits in Courts 2,
3, or4.
2. Anti-gaming and Robustness
For similar reasons, the concurrence approach is also "robust" to later
changes in other courts' awards. This is a potential advantage over the
alternative solution of barring subsequent awards. Suppose that a given
state bars Plaintiff 2 from seeking punitive damages because an earlier
case has already awarded them to Plaintiff 1.4' But what if Plaintiff I's
39 Note again, however, that as a practical matter the defendant will have good reason to
inform Court 1 about the possibility of future punitive damages in Court 2, once Court 1 has
decided to award punitive damages. Likewise, if Court 2 imposes punitive damages and is
considering running them concurrently, the defendant will want to inform Court 2 about the
penalty it already faces in Court 1.
40 By contrast, under a forward-looking scheme like Minnesota's, Court I must speculate
as to what subsequent courts might do because punitive damages in the present case are to be
assessed (and thus pre-adjusted) with an eye toward "the total effect of other punishment
likely to be imposed upon the defendant." Minn. Stat. § 549.20 subdiv. 3 (2012).
41 This can occur in first-come, first-served states such as Florida. See Fla. Stat.
§ 768.73(2)(a) (2013) ("[Plunitive damages may not be awarded against a defendant in a civ-
il action if that defendant establishes ... that punitive damages have previously been award-
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award is later reduced or overturned on appeal? Plaintiff 2's award can-
not then be increased, unless that case can be reopened for new proceed-
ings on damages, and so the defendant may well gain a windfall.
The use of concurrent damages, by contrast, can avoid such a lapse in
punishment and deterrence because Plaintiff 2's formal award will have
already been declared in full. No matter what happens to Plaintiff l's
punitive award, the defendant remains on the hook for at least the
amount announced for Plaintiff 2.42
The same advantage applies to forward-looking reductions as well:
What if Plaintiff l's punitive damages are preemptively reduced (as
some courts have done)43 due to a worry that future plaintiffs might also
sue-but then it turns out that no other plaintiffs come forward? Again,
using concurrent damages can avoid the problem of remittitur regret.
A closely related advantage is that the concurrence approach takes the
profit out of manipulative gaming of the system (by either side). As a
foil, consider those states that have adopted a first-come, first-served ap-
proach, barring punitive awards beyond the first case that awards them.4
The opportunities for gaming by defendants are self-evident: litigating
against the weakest plaintiff first, forum shopping, and so forth. The
concurrence approach eliminates such incentives for manipulation, both
because it requires each court to declare the full amount of the proper
punitive award and because, crucially, the defendant will always end up
having to pay the highest formal amount.45 In a parallel way, if anticipa-
tory concurrence is known to be available, its general use can avoid the
sort of racing to the courthouse by plainttffs that is likely to occur under
ed against that defendant in any state or federal court in any action alleging harm from the
same act or single course of conduct for which the claimant seeks compensatory damages.").
42 An alternative approach of reducing or offsetting a later punitive award by the amount
of earlier awards could in theory share this advantage, if in operation the credit for an earlier
award could be revoked as needed.
43 One such example is Judge Friendly's case. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
378 F.2d 832, 838-44 (2d Cir. 1967). Again, Minnesota's punitive damages statute also in-
vites such speculative, anticipatory reduction. See supra note 40.
44 Florida is a leading example. See supra note 41. Other states have resisted this approach.
See, e.g., Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Ky. 1998)
("[I]t would be unfair to this plaintiff to bar his claim for punitive damages just because oth-
er plaintiffs have previously recovered damages arising out of the same conduct.").
5 Note that this advantage is shared by the "offset" approach adopted in a handful of
states. See infra note 46.
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those alternative solutions that favor the first plaintiff (such as offsets or
bars on later awards).46
3. Complementing Preclusion Law
The law of preclusion does not solve the redundant punitive damages
problem. To the contrary-nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel, as
endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,47
potentially allows Plaintiff 2 to piggyback on Plaintiff l's victory.48
Asymmetrically, however, the defendant cannot make use of Plaintiff
46 For an example of an offset policy, see Mo. Rev. Stat. § 510.263(4) (2000), which de-
scribes an offset system whereby a later punitive damages award is reduced by the amount of
a prior punitive damages award. Notably, this Missouri statute generated a dispute over how
to apply the offset when two cases proceeded at roughly the same time and their sequencing
became tangled. See Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca, 963 S.W.2d. 639, 653-54
(Mo. Ct. App. 1997). Other states with an offset system include Oklahoma and Oregon. See
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 9.1 (C)(2) (West 2011) (providing that the "[tirial court shall reduce
any award for punitive damages" by the amount of punitive damages the defendant has pre-
viously paid); Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.730(3) (2013) ("In reducing awards of punitive damag-
es... the court shall consider the amount of any previous judgment for punitive damages
entered against the same defendant for the same conduct giving rise to a claim for punitive
damages."). Some states allow previous awards to be considered in assessing a new award.
See Gagnon v. Continental Cas. Co., 260 Cal. Rptr. 305, 306-07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (not-
ing that "whether punitive damages previously have been imposed for the same conduct" is a
relevant consideration in deciding the amount of a punitive damage award); Owens-Coming
Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Tex. 1998) ("[E]vidence
about ... previously paid punitive damage awards.., for the same course of conduct is rel-
evant and may be admitted when a defendant offers it to mitigate punitive damages.").
47 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979) (upholding a federal court's application of nonmutual of-
fensive collateral estoppel, in its discretion, while also articulating factors to be considered
by the courts in exercising this discretion). Note that the Parklane factors tend not to be es-
pecially useful for counseling a court against applying preclusion in the context of redundant
punitive damages. For instance, although one factor is whether plaintiffs are likely to take
advantage of the availability of preclusion by waiting until another plaintiff wins, such a
strategy seems unlikely for plaintiffs seeking punitive damages-who, if anything, may tend
to race to the courthouse instead. See id. at 330 (describing the "wait and see" criterion).
Similarly, the worry that the "defendant in the first action is sued for small or nominal dam-
ages" and may thus have "little incentive to defend vigorously" seems plainly irrelevant in
cases involving punitive damages. Id.48 Likewise, the same phenomenon may occur in the many states that also permit nonmu-
tual offensive collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Tofany v. NBS Imaging Sys., 616 N.E.2d 1034,
1038 (Ind. 1993) (endorsing the use of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel); Falgren v.
Bd. of Teaching, 545 N.W.2d 901, 907-08 (Minn. 1996) (same); In re Caranchini, 956
S.W.2d 910, 914 (Mo. 1997) (same); Silva v. State, 745 P.2d 380, 384 (N.M. 1987) (same);
Koch v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 468 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 1984) (same).
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l's victory and windfall against Plaintiff 2.'9 (Nor could it use Plaintiff
I's loss.) This may all be quite sensible as far as the law of preclusion
goes. But the asymmetry feeds the repetitive damages problem by en-
couraging piggybacking by Plaintiff 2, Plaintiff 3, and so forth. The use
of concurrent punitive damages rebalances this asymmetry by deflating
the incentives to pile on, and, more generally, by reducing redundancy in
the awards that might result.
Another preclusion device sometimes touted as a potential solution-
the mandatory punitive damages class action-has yet to prove palatable
to the courts,5° and the outlook is not promising.5  And, of course, it
cannot be a general solution, because many redundant punitive damages
situations are unsuitable for the class action form. One might then sup-
pose that non-class aggregation-such as consolidation-may be able to
do some good, but that approach depends on whether the cases are all
located in the same state or are removable to (or already within) the fed-
eral system.52 Concurrence, by contrast, is used by a court unilateral-
ly 53-and does not depend on any such happenstance of procedural
alignment with other cases.
49 See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884 (2008) (noting that, generally, nonparties can-
not be bound by the preclusive effect of past judgments or findings, except under limited
conditions).
50 For now, the one shining example, in the case of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, remains an
anomaly. See Linda S. Mullenix, Nine Lives: The Punitive Damages Class, 58 U. Kan. L.
Rev. 845, 863-67 (2010) (recognizing the Exxon Valdez case to be a unique instance of the
mandatory punitive damages class). The Exxon Valdez example is also anomalous in that
punitive damages were barred in parallel state court litigation based on "deference to [the]
federal court order creating a federal mandatory punitive damages class. " Chenega Corp. v.
Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 769, 775 (Alaska 1999). There is no general guarantee, of course,
that any future court would defer to another in this way.
51 See In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125, 134-36 (2d Cir. 2005) (rejecting District Judge
Jack Weinstein's attempt to certify a mandatory punitive damages class using a "limited
punishment" theory). Given the U.S. Supreme Court's recent habit of raising the bar for
class certification at almost every turn, the prospects for class-action solutions to the redun-
dant punitive damages problem appear grim.
52 Moreover, consolidation can bring together only cases that are already pending; when
claims arise over time, it is easy to imagine situations where "consolidation would not pre-
vent multiple punitive damages awards." Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort
Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 Fordham L.
Rev. 37, 62 n.141 (1983).
53 The tradeoff that the unilateral nature of the use of concurrence entails is, of course, that
earlier and later courts addressing the same conduct by the same defendant might nonethe-
less disagree about whether (and to what extent) concurrence should be used. See supra Sub-
section I.A.3.
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A deeper problem remains, anyway, in relying on aggregation devices
(including non-class forms): There is no guarantee that aggregated pro-
ceedings will result in lower awards than in separately tried cases. True,
there may be some natural compression when a single court deals out the
punitive damages for many plaintiffs at once.54 But think of juries calcu-
lating punitive damages by applying a multiplier to compensatory dam-
ages; the sum total punitive amount would be the same whether the cas-
es were aggregated or tried one by one. This is where a concurrence
option can be crucial, allowing the compression to happen as the court
deems appropriate. To be clear, concurrence can work in the absence of
aggregation-the point here is that concurrence may in fact be needed
for aggregation to do any real work at all.
II. HYPER-ENFORCEMENT OF STATUTORY DAMAGES
Damages of at least $750 per song;" at least $1000 per unauthorized
login;5 6 at least $5500 per false invoice;57 and at least $10,000 per wire-
tap 58-the high dollar ranges often found in statutory damages provi-
sions carry an unmistakable in terrorem message. One might understand
the not-so-subtle warning as: "Even if you think your chances of getting
caught are low, penalties like these make it not worth the risk." One
54 For instance, a deterrence-focused court that would have assessed a higher multiplier in
a single-plaintiff case (based on the perception that the probability of successful enforce-
ment, p, is low) might in an aggregated case recognize that p is in fact higher, and hence that
the (l1p) multiplier should be lower.
5 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012) (providing a standard range of $750
to $30,000 per work if the infringements are not willful).
56 Stored Communications Act, Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) (2012) ("[I]n no case shall a person entitled to recover receive
less than the sum of $1,000."). As glossed by the courts, this is calculated as a per-intrusion
amount. See Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc. v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, LLC, 759
F. Supp. 2d 417, 428-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 355 B.R. 225, 232
(D. Haw. 2006). The nuances of the courts' interpretations of this provision are discussed in
my earlier article. See Huang, supra note 8, at 747-50.
57 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006) (mandating "a civil penalty of not less
than $5,000 and not more than $10,000"). This range, currently adjusted for inflation, is
$5,500 to $11,000.
58 Wiretap Act, Title III of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2520(c)(2)(B) (2012) (mandating "statutory damages of whichever is the greater of $100 a
day for each day of violation or $10,000").
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might also perceive a message aimed at potential plaintiffs: "Penalties
like these make it worth your while to sue."'5 9
Both messages reflect aims that are said to motivate the use of mini-
mum awards in statutory damages schemes: respectively, deterrence and
inducing litigation.6° Each aim is vulnerable, however, to what we might
call the problem of "hyper-enforcement": when the levels of enforce-
ment (or the chances of proving liability) turn out to be higher than an-
ticipated in the statutory design, leading to overdeterrence in expectation
and possibly to surprisingly punitive levels of damages.61 This Part con-
siders each vulnerability in turn, explaining how the notions of "fixed"
and "variable" damages map onto each problem-and how the proce-
dural device of running damages concurrently can be used to solve it.
A. Redundant Inducements to Sue
The high per-count ranges or minimums in certain statutory damages
provisions are said to have the purpose of "encourag[ing] the prosecu-
tion of cases that would otherwise be too costly for an individual plain-
tiff to pursue. 62 That is, the minimum award per count is artificially in-
59 See, e.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm't, 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that
minimum statutory damages in the Cable Act are intended "to encourage the filing of indi-
vidual lawsuits ... often because there would otherwise be no incentive to bring an individ-
ual claim"); see also infra note 62.
60 The messages also interact, of course, not least in suggesting to defendants that plaintiffs
are likely to sue-thus giving more force to the deterrent effect.
61 Note that even the statutory damages schemes that include amplified ranges of per-count
awards (such as for "willful" or more egregious behavior)-and thus have a punitive fla-
vor-can reach "surprisingly" punitive levels if those ranges are set based on predictions of a
lower probability of successful enforcement than turns out to be true. More generally, it has
not gone unnoticed that statutory damages may acquire a punitive effect. See Pamela Samu-
elson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Re-
form, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 439, 462 (2009) ("Even when judges or juries do not explicit-
ly say they are intent on punishing defendants, the [statutory damages] awards they
sometimes make are punitive in effect."). In practice, however, whether they have such a
punitive effect may have little or no effect on appellate review, as long as the damages re-
main within the statutory limits. See 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copyright § 14.04(B)(1)(a) (2009) ("Although the standards enunciated for awarding statu-
tory damages run from approval of a punitive approach to disapproval of punishment, those
standards are largely precatory; as long as the district court acts within the prescribed statuto-
ry limits, its discretion will probably be upheld on appeal.").62 Parker v. Time Warner Entm't, 631 F. Supp. 2d 242, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); accord Par-
ker, 331 F.3d at 22 (noting that, in a Cable Act case, minimum per-customer statutory dam-
ages are imposed "usually in order to encourage the filing of individual lawsuits"); see also
Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 115 (D. Mass. 2010), aff'd in
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flated to include an inducement to bring suit. The problem with this sys-
tem is self-evident: Ideally, such a bonus for inducing suit would not be
embedded in the per-count award, but rather take the form of a fixed
per-case subsidy. Yet in reality, the per-count bonus remains typical of
statutory damages schemes.63
Embedded in each statutory award, then, is a bonus to induce litiga-
tion that should not be automatically repeated with every further count.
Whatever the level of the desired litigation subsidy, it is a "fixed" and
not a "variable" component of the damages in a given enforcement ac-
tion.64 With more and more counts, as the artificially inflated per-count
awards stack up, any need for further encouragement evaporates.65 In
cases with a large number of counts, moreover, such stacking-up will
rapidly outstrip the ideal level of damages and reach heights fairly de-
scribed as "surprisingly punitive." See Figure 1.
The best known variation of this hyper-enforcement problem occurs
when class actions are brought seeking statutory damages for each of
thousands or even millions of total counts.66 Most famous may be the
proposed class of 12 million Time Warner customers-in a case about
part, vacated in part, 660 F.3d 487 (1 st Cir. 2011) (noting that the Copyright Act's "statutory
damages ranges likely include some amount to compensate copyright owners for the costs
entailed in investigating and detecting infringing behavior," and citing a report of the Regis-
ter of Copyrights, which noted the aim of ensuring recovery adequate "to warrant the ex-
pense of detecting infringements"); Forman v. Data Transfer Inc., 164 F.R.D. 400, 404 (E.D.
Pa. 1995) (noting that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act's statutory damages mini-
mum of $500 per violation "is designed to provide adequate incentive for an individual
plaintiff to bring suit on his own behalf').
63 The problems with the linearity of per-count award schemes may simply have escaped
the attention of the drafters of some such statutes. In the case of the Copyright Act, the draft-
ers appear to have dismissed the possibility out of hand: "We believe that the danger of ex-
orbitant awards in multiple infringement cases is more theoretical than real.... We know of
no case where the resulting total was considered excessive." Staff of H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 87th Cong., Rep. of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S.
Copyright Law 105 (Comm. Print 1961), reprinted in 3 Omnibus Copyright Revision Legis-
lative History (George S. Grossman ed., 1976).
64 The analysis offered here can easily be adapted to situations in which the desired litiga-
tion subsidy increases (though not linearly) with the number of plaintiffs or violations. But
for exposition's sake, the implicit assumption is that the desired inducement subsidy is fixed
per case.
65 One potential complication here is that in some cases it may take multiple counts' worth
of accumulated bonuses before reaching the supposedly desired level of litigation subsidy; if
so, it is only after such a threshold is met that the further litigation bonuses become redun-
dant.
66 For a collection of cases, see Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Prob-
lem of Statutory Damages and Class Actions, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 103, 105-06 (2009).
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disclosure of customer information-in which the statutory minimum of
$1000 per count would imply a minimum of $12 billion in damages.67
Or consider the potentially $1.9 billion in statutory damages claimed
against Chuck E. Cheese for a technical violation in the printing of mil-
lions of customer receipts.68
What is wrong here, observers typically say, is that such a litigation
bonus becomes extraneous when the class action device is available as
an alternative solution to the problem of enforcing small individual
claims.69 As a leading commentator neatly put it, the standard worry is
"that class treatment would turn the per-customer statutory damag-
es. . . into a hammer so heavy as to be beyond any plausible account of
the underlying remedial scheme .. . [b]ecause Congress already had set
the remedial scheme to make claims worthwhile on a disaggregated ba-
sis.''7
67 See Parker, 331 F.3d 13. The assumption running throughout the following analysis,
perhaps a debatable one, is that the $1000 minimum is more than the true harm to each vic-
tim (of the unacknowledged disclosures)-so that not all of it is properly considered "varia-
ble" in our conceptual framework. Were this amount deemed to be entirely a "variable"
component, of course, then there would be no cause for concern, and a court could simply
forgo the use of concurrence in such a case.
6 Blanco v. CEC Entm't Concepts L.P., No. CV 07-0559 GPS (JWJx), 2008 WL 239658
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008). This and other startling cases under the federal Fair and Accurate
Credit Transactions Act, as well as the rather weak congressional response to such cases
(namely, creating a grace period for a narrow category of non-willful violations), are dis-
cussed in Scheuerman, supra note 66, at 105-06 & n. 11.
69 See, e.g., Parker, 331 F.3d at 22 ("We acknowledge Judge Glasser's legitimate concern
that the potential for a devastatingly large damages award, out of all reasonable proportion to
the actual harm suffered by members of the plaintiff class, may raise due process issues.
Those issues arise from the effects of combining a statutory scheme that imposes minimum
statutory damages awards on a per-consumer basis-usually in order to encourage the filing
of individual lawsuits as a means of private enforcement of consumer protection laws-with
the class action mechanism that aggregates many claims-often because there would other-
wise be no incentive to bring an individual claim.").
70 Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure,
Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1872, 1903 (2006) (discussing Par-
ker, 331 F.3d 13); see also Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the
Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 17, 73-74 (2010) (discussing ten-
sion between "the possibility of crushing aggregate penalties" and "providing remedies that
will induce individual enforcement"); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private En-
forcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1137, 1191-92 (2012) (not-
ing possible "remedial overkill"); cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., v. Allstate Ins., 130
S. Ct. 1431, 1472 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (analogizing class action limitation to
damages cap).
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But that cannot be the whole problem. After all, it is not multi-party
aggregation per se that is driving the surprisingly punitive amount at
stake. Rather, the driver is simply the huge number of counts. And a
large number of counts is possible even when there is only a single
plaintiff. Thus, even if the class-action difficulty can be averted, say, by
a refusal to certify such a class, the general problem does not go away so
easily.
A more general solution may be possible, however. In both the single-
plaintiff scenario and the class action variant, a concurrent damages op-
tion can be used to counteract such excessive piling-on of the litigation
bonus. There are at least two ways to use concurrent damages here.7'
First, taking a cruder approach, a court can truncate the accumulation of
damages (beyond a certain desired level of total award) by running any
further counts concurrently.
Second, taking a more conceptually precise approach, the court can
designate a fraction of each count's award as representing the "variable"
component-for instance, reflecting the harm done by each count. The
remaining fraction of each award would then be counted toward the liti-
gation subsidy; thus, for any counts beyond those needed to reach the
desired level of subsidy, the court would run those portions concurrent-
ly. See Figure 2. After that point, only the variable portion of each award
would be allowed to accumulate for each further count, and properly
SO.
72
71 Either way, in the class action variant of the problem, the properly contained amount
would then be allocated among the class.
72As is evident from comparing Figures 1 and 2, the approach described here creates a
damages curve lying between the subsidized harm curve and the unsubsidized harm curve
(and parallel to both). A court wishing instead to approximate the subsidized harm curve can
do so simply by allowing more per-count subsidies to accumulate first (in effect, following
the statutory damages curve until it meets the subsidized harm curve in Figure 1, before
starting to run concurrently any further per-count subsidies). In theory, a court can also ap-
proximate the unsubsidized harm curve while taking advantage of the per-count subsidies-
though such a path is probably too complicated to be attractive in practice (namely, follow-
ing the statutory damages curve until reaching the level of desired subsidy, then flat-lining
by running entire per-count awards concurrently, before proceeding up the unsubsidized
harm curve once it surpasses the level of desired subsidy).
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B. More Counts, More Enforcement?
A more general problem of hyper-enforcement can occur when statu-
tory damages are understood to serve deterrence.13 In copyright, for ex-
ample, statutory damages are said to serve not only to compensate but
also to "discourage wrongful conduct";74 they "furnish the deter-
rence... necessary for prospective infringers."75 For trademark viola-
tions, they are aimed partly at compensation and partly "at deterrence of
future counterfeiting-both by the bad actor in question and by other po-
tential counterfeiters. 76 Notably, some statements suggest that the statu-
tory penalties are inflated because the real or perceived probability of
being penalized is low. For example, legislative history accompanying
an enhancement to the statutory damages provisions of the Copyright
Act expressly noted, about downloading and file-sharing, that "[m]any
computer users.., simply believe that they will not be caught or prose-
cuted for their conduct" and that thus "more stringent deterrents" were
needed.77
One might thus view the high dollar awards specified in some statutes
as making up for presumptively low probabilities of detection, litigation,
or proof.78 (This aim has also been recognized, of course, as one purpose
73 The following exposition will speak in terms of optimal deterrence, but the main points
are easily translatable to absolute deterrence (by substituting gains for harms, as the touch-
stone).
74 F.W. Woolworth Co. v Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952).
75 Staff of S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., Copyright Law Revision, Studies 22-
25, at 9 (Comm. Print 1960). These studies are taken as legislative history for the Copyright
Act of 1976. See also Staff of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 63, at 103 ("[S]tatutory
damages are intended (1) to assure adequate compensation.., and (2) to deter infringe-
ment.").
76 Stark Carpet Corp. v. Stark Carpet & Flooring Installations Corp., 954 F. Supp. 2d 145,
154 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Burberry Ltd. v. Euro Moda, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 5781 (CM)
(AJP), 2009 WL 4432678, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2009) (observing that the award should
operate "to discourage further wrongdoing by the defendant and others"); Staff of H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, supra note 6375, at 156 (noting that the award "will serve both as a specific
deterrent for Defendant and a general deterrent for others contemplating the infringement of
valid trademarks").77 H.R. Rep. No. 106-216, at 2-3 (1999) (explaining the purpose of House Bill 1761,
which became part of the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement
Act of 1999). For an analysis of file-sharing liability in light of the Copyright Act's history,
see Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright's Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute
in the Internet Age, 59 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 1 (2011).
78 See, e.g., Williams v. Pub. Fin. Corp., 598 F.2d 349, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1979) (explaining
that the Truth-in-Lending Act provision awarding plaintiff actual damages plus twice the
finance charge of the loan, and all attorney and court costs, is "designed to deter generally
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served by punitive damages.79) But what if the resulting statutory awards
ranges are based on assumptions of low enforcement-and yet actual en-
forcement turns out to be higher?8 °
The following analysis focuses on one intuitive but tricky form of this
problem: when the probability of successful enforcement increases with
the number of violations.81 It is easy to imagine why this may occur.
Private enforcers may be more motivated to pursue cases with higher
counts and thus higher potential winnings.82 Some public enforcers may
also act this way. 83 More mechanically, monitoring by both private and
public enforcers may be more likely to detect actors who engage in mul-
illegalities which are only rarely uncovered and punished"); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v.
LY USA, No. 06 Civ. 13463(AKH), 2008 WL 5637161, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2008) (ex-
plaining that statutory damages are useful when counterfeiters' records are "nonexistent, in-
adequate or deceptively kept in order to willfully deflate the level of counterfeiting activity
actually engaged in, making proving actual damages in these cases extremely difficult if not
impossible"). For a fuller discussion of the variety of reasons for enhancing damages to
compensate for a low probability of sanction, see Sharkey, supra note 4, at 366-67. For an
economic analysis, see Keith Hylton & Thomas Miceli, Should Tort Damages Be Multi-
plied?, 21 J.L. Econ. & Org. 388 (2005).
79 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (noting that "[a] higher
ratio may also be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect").
80 The general problem of setting deterrence multipliers when enforcement probabilities
can change (such as based on the salience or seriousness of the offense) is thoroughly exam-
ined in Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alterna-
tives, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2185 (1999).
81 What makes this variant of the problem more difficult is that the seemingly direct ap-
proach-adjusting the statutory minimum up or down-is not a well-tailored solution to the
problem of variation in probabilities from case to case.
82 Class actions, of course, are the archetype of this phenomenon. Punitive damages are
also seen as motivating for plaintiffs in a similar way. See, e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Pun-
ishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 831, 846-
47 (1989) ("In some cases damages may be so limited that the citizen who considers suing is
discouraged from doing so, even though a suit would be socially useful.... The potential of
a punitive award may make a claim worthwhile that otherwise would not be."); A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev.
869, 895 (1998) (explaining that punitive damages, by incentivizing suits, decrease the
chances that a defendant will escape liability).
83 Joint public-private enforcement also occurs in some contexts, such as in qui tam litiga-
tion under the False Claims Act. See David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private At-
torney General: Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1244 (2012) (empir-
ically assessing qui tam litigation). For evidence that public enforcers differentiate between
larger and smaller targets in their likelihood of pursuing enforcement, see, e.g., Stavros
Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against Broker-
Dealers, 67 Bus. Law. 679, 682, 685 (2012).
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tiple violations-and likewise, proof of wrongdoing may be easier to es-
tablish.84
The device of concurrent damages can be used to neutralize the extra
multiplier for expected damages caused by such increases in the proba-
bility of successful enforcement. (It should be emphasized that the use of
concurrence does not imply undercompensating plaintiffs. Recall that
the awards are assumed to be already inflated beyond actual harm, by
design; the use of concurrence, in effect, adjusts the degree of that infla-
tion.)
To illustrate, think of a fast-flowing river, and assume that each dis-
charge of pollutants by a factory causes the same amount of harm. For
instance, each successive discharge may contaminate the river water in
essentially the same way-say, temporarily raising the concentration of
contaminants from zero to a certain amount. Now consider two factories,
each discharging ten times (and thus their activities are equally harnful)
in its own river. Factory 1 does so over the course of one day. Factory 2
does so once a day for ten days. It is easy to imagine how the chance of
detection for Factory 2 could be higher than for Factory 1; indeed, the
probability may well be ten times higher. This would be the case, for in-
stance, if the enforcer monitors by auditing, randomly choosing one day
a month to observe water quality in a given river.85
Assume that discovery of any single discharge leads to the eventual
revelation of each factory's complete polluting behavior.86 The expected
84 Moreover, a rise in expected per-count penalties may increase with N (the number of
counts) for other reasons. For example, proving a higher N may also raise the chance of
proving the behavior to be willful or knowing-thus triggering further statutory multipliers,
such as treble damages. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012) (increased maximum under
the Copyright Act); 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2006) (treble damages under the Telephone Con-
sumer Protection Act).
85 This auditing method is constructed so that the probability of detection for each factory
can be calculated simply as the ratio (number of days in which any discharge occurs/number
of days in the month). This simplification is for exposition's sake, and of course other rela-
tionships between the number of counts and the probability of enforcement are possible. For
variations, including the more difficult problem presented when the probability increases
faster than proportionally with the increase in counts, see infra note 95.
86 One judge has noticed such a problem in the context of the Copyright Act:
However, the Copyright Act does not contain a provision to correct for the fact that
once a recording company has decided to devote the resources necessary to detect one
act of infringement by a file sharer, the marginal cost of detecting additional acts of
infringement is likely low since the investigation of the file sharer's account on a
peer-to-peer network will generally reveal a treasure trove of unlawfully downloaded
works. As a result, the imposition of statutory damages in file-sharing cases where
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penalty internalized by Factory 2 would thus be ten times greater than
for Factory 1, even though for optimal deterrence they should be inter-
nalizing the (same) total harm they each cause.87 If the statutory penalty
is appropriately set for deterring Factory 1, then it is ten times too large
for Factory 2.
Consider now Factory 3, which discharges only once-say, on the
first day.88 Factory 2 causes ten times as much harm as Factory 3, and
yet its expected penalty is one hundred times higher (because its proba-
bility of detection is also ten times higher). As before, Factory 2's penal-
ty needs to be compressed by a factor of ten. This contrast between Fac-
tory 2 and Factory 3 sets in sharp relief the difficulty for any court trying
to articulate the reason for compressing Factory 2's damages, 89 if it were
to do so by directly reducing the per-count award.
Imagine what the court would have to say: "The award per discharge
for the factory with ten violations should be lower than for the factory
that did it only once-and in fact, it should be only one-tenth as large."
It may well be possible for the court to explain this (logically sound)
discount, but the seeming injustice of it may remain a practical obstacle.
1. Using Concurrent Damages
The option of running damages concurrently offers an alternative way
to compensate for the extra multiplier on expected damages, due to a
higher probability of enforcement, in cases where the statutory award
range was set assuming a lower probability.90 It is especially useful
when a minimum statutory award precludes lowering the per-count
multiple copyrighted works have been infringed can produce awards much greater
than necessary to provide copyright owners with an adequate incentive to investigate
and detect infringement.
Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 115 (D. Mass. 2010) (Gertner,
J.).
87 The assumption, as before, is that the penalty is applied to each discharge separately if
they occur on the same day. This is the reading courts have given to the Clean Water Act's
damages under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2006). See Borden Ranch P'ship v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 261 F.3d 810, 817-18 (2001) (interpreting "per day for each violation" under 33
U.S.C. § 1319(d)).
88 Thus Factory 3, like Factory 1, faces accurate incentives from the optimal deterrence
perspective.
89 Doing so would be tricky in either an opinion or jury instructions.
90 The order-of-magnitude errors that are possible are not easy to accept as "rough justice,"
even if the probabilities at issue are knowable only as rough approximations.
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award directly, of course, but it is also useful when such an artificial ad-
justment is undesirable even if the range would allow it.9
To see its application in the case of the three factories, assume as be-
fore that the statutory per-count award is set appropriately for Factories
1 and 3 (that is, it is inflated to account for their low chances of being
sanctioned). For Factory 2, then, the court would recognize the ten
counts, one for each discharge-but run them all concurrently. On this
illustration's assumptions, such a compression exactly adjusts for the ex-
tra multiplier due to this polluter's higher probability of detection.
The use of concurrence can be readily generalized (beyond such a
stylized illustration) through the careful application of our conceptual
framework of "fixed" and "variable" portions of damages. The key is
understanding these components to be responsive to the probabilities of
successful enforcement. As the probability increases, the "variable"
component of each award diminishes (for the simple reason that there is
less of a need for the artificial per-count boost meant to make up for low
probabilities). Thus, in the case of Factory 2, the "variable" component
is one-tenth of each award, rather than the full award; only that fraction
should be repeated for each of the ten counts. In essence, then, the court
is running the remaining nine-tenths of each per-count award concur-
rently with all other awards.92 This is the more conceptually precise-
and more generalizable-way of understanding what is described in the
simplified illustration above as running all the counts concurrently.
2. Enforcement Motivations
One further intuitive and possibly more realistic variation should be
addressed: What if the reason for the increase in probability is partly
motivational-say, because the enforcer is more likely to pursue a case
with a larger potential recovery? 93 Consider a Factory 4 that discharges
on five separate days, twice a day. It thus faces a five times greater
chance of being caught in an audit than Factory 3. Suppose further that,
upon detection, the enforcer is twice as likely to pursue a "large" case
(say, one with a potential recovery of at least ten times the single-
91 The potential disadvantages of such "artificial averaging" or fictional pricing are ex-
plored in my earlier article. See Huang, supra note 8, at 738-41.
92 The similarity should thus be quite apparent between this usage and the use of anticipa-
tory concurrence in the punitive damages setting, as described in Subsection I.A.3.
93 An analogous story can be told in which the enforcer is more likely to audit in the first
place when it knows that there is bigger game to be caught.
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discharge award). Factory 4 therefore faces a ten times higher chance of
sanction than Factory 3. But now the needed compression is no longer
achieved by running all ten counts concurrently (unlike for Factory 2).
Rather, it is achieved by running the ten counts concurrently as two
awards (compressing by a factor of five)-which if anticipated by the
enforcer would lead to a further reduction in the chance of enforcement
(by a factor of two), thereby resulting in the correct degree of deter-
rence.
94
Notice how the use of concurrent damages would properly deflate the
motivation to enforce, whether the exaggeration factor is two (as above)
or some other number X. This mechanism implies that the court faces
conveniently low information demands: To achieve proper deterrence,
nothing had to be known about how much the enforcer's motivation
might be exaggerated by the size of the award. The reason is simply that
the concurrent damages option is used to reach the accurate award; con-
sequently, any amount of an enforcer's extra motivation from anticipat-
ing a further windfall would be deflated just by bringing the award down
to size. 9
CONCLUSION: ON ACOUSTIC SEPARATION
Consider the following thought experiment, which overturns a central
assumption of the preceding analysis: What if the excessive damages de-
scribed thus far are not unexpected or unintended but instead are pur-
94 The question arises whether this shift from more to less avid enforcement is a good
thing. The answer necessarily varies by context, of course. One might argue, for instance,
that it is good for public enforcers (because of savings to the fisc) but bad for private enforc-
ers (from the ex post perspective, as some would not pursue compensation). For an analysis
suggesting that costly private enforcement, induced by high potential damages, can be wel-
fare-reducing, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Welfare Implications of
Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability, 17 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1988).
95 Several technical notes are in order. It is probably too far a stretch to think that the fol-
lowing variations could be identified by the court in any real case (beyond the simplest kind
of rough proportionality suggested in the text), but they are worth noting for the sake of
completeness. First, what if the probability of successful enforcement, p, increases more
slowly than the number of counts, N? If the chance of enforcement increases by a factor of
(I IF) times as fast as the number of counts N, then the N awards should be run concurrently
as F awards. Second, what if p increases faster than N? If it is not possible to run N awards
concurrently as a fraction of an award, then concurrence can only partially adjust toward the
accurate multiplier (unless there is the dual mechanism at work, as noted above). Finally,
what happens if p reaches 1, at a high enough N? The court should no longer increase the
degree of compression beyond that point, because p also cannot increase any further.
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poseful messages aimed at deterring a class of overconfident actors who
misperceive their chances of escaping liability as better than they actual-
ly are?
Up to now, it has been assumed that violators know when their prob-
ability of liability is low and when it is high. But their perceptions may
not be correct. What if they are overconfident about getting away with
their misconduct? For deterrence purposes, it may be better for such
overconfident actors not to know that concurrence may be used, even if
it will be.96 And if all violators were overconfident in this way, then
there might be no use for concurrence.
But the problem is the existence of other actors who have more accu-
rate perceptions. For them, believing that concurrence can and will be
used is what prevents overdeterrence. 97 This tension forces a tradeoff for
the legal designer deciding whether to include a concurrence option, and
for the court deciding whether to apply it. Should concurrent damages be
used, thus underdeterring the overoptimists--or not, thus overdeterring
the realists? Should concurrence be used, but the damages range in-
creased somewhat, as a compromise approach? Should concurrence be
forgone, but the damages range decreased?
A release from this dilemma may be possible when there is "acoustic
separation" in a concurrent damages regime; that is, when the availabil-
ity of concurrent damages is not salient to some potential violators, due
to their naivety about the legal system.98 It then becomes possible to de-
96 Recall the story of Factory 2 by the river, discharging on ten different days. Its expected
damages are inflated by a factor often because the probability of detection increases with the
number of days of discharge (and the polluter knows it). What if instead this polluter does
not anticipate that discharging on more days entails a greater chance of being caught? Pre-
cisely because it misperceives its own chances of enforcement, this polluter ends up correct-
ly deterred; in a sense, the relentless linearity of the damages schedule offsets overoptimism
about evading detection.
97 Seeing the inflated statutory damages imposed without concurrence, as suggested for the
overoptimist's case, would have an overdeterring effect on these more realistic actors. Per-
haps in a few cases it may be easy for such a realistic actor to recognize that concurrence
was forgone in a prior case because the earlier actor was an overoptimistic type (for exam-
ple, a seasoned illegal infringer of copyrighted music might see the defendants in the Sony
and Capitol Records end-user downloading cases as naive and overoptimistic). See Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012); Sony BMG Music Entm't v.
Tenenbaum, Civ. No. 07-11446-RWZ, 2012 WL 3639053 (D. Mass. Aug. 23, 2012). But
generally, what happens in prior cases probably casts a shadow for future actors in a more
generic way.
98 The concept of "acoustic separation" is introduced in Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules
and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984).
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couple what the overoptimists expect (a harsh damages regime) from
what the realists expect (the potential use of concurrence)-if the over-
optimists tend also to be more naive about how damages are actually ap-
plied. 99
But that is a big "if." The correlation is presumably positive in some
contexts; those who are naive about how damages are assessed might
tend to overlap with those who are unaware of the real chances of en-
forcement. Still, poor overlap in a given context would weaken the case
for such decoupling through acoustic separation. And in a plausible sort
of reversed situation, with the sophisticates thinking they can elude de-
tection, acoustic separation should be actively avoided: These sophisti-
cates need to know that concurrence will be properly forgone in their
cases, while the naive need to be told that concurrence will properly be
used in theirs.
99 A similar logic applies to overoptimism of other sorts-such as about the harm that may
be done. For instance, in the statutory damages context, if an overoptimist mistakenly thinks
that she will not cause much harm (and that therefore she will not be liable for much in dam-
ages), then the harsh message of a linear statutory damages scheme may be just what she
needs to hear. It is an especially accurate message if she thinks her harms are marginally di-
minishing, when in fact they do add up linearly. For example, think of a polluter by a fast-
flowing river who mistakenly believes that only the first few discharges will do all the harm
(when in fact each further discharge will continue to do the same amount of harm as the
last), and hence mistakenly believes that there will be no legal consequence to further pollut-
ing. (In the reverse situation, with the actor thinking her harms are linear when in fact they
are marginally diminishing, the court should use concurrence ex post-and make this prac-
tice widely known ex ante. That is, acoustic separation should be actively avoided.) For a
fuller discussion of "diminishing marginal harm," see Huang, supra note 8, at 730-35. Like-
wise, overoptimism about gains may also be counteracted through such decoupling, if the
aim is absolute deterrence. In the case of gains, the information demands on the court may
seem unusual: How could a court have a more accurate sense of the gains curve than the vio-
lator? But note that the absolute deterrence approach unavoidably requires courts (or legal
designers) to assess such gains curves. For further analysis, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Ste-
ven Shavell, Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injur-
er?, 10 J.L. Econ. & Org. 427 (1994) (discussing costs of legal error under each approach).
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